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Abstract
To what extent can the distribution of income in a society be
explained by its distribution of education?
This article focuses on differences in earnings, which are sub-
stantial, although differences in total income are of course also due to
significant differences in property income among households. Differences
in the fraction of earnings attributable to differences in schooling,
after controlling for ability, and as measured by the alpha coefficient,
are found to range between .80 and .90 in most recent research, for
example.
Since human capital formation in school and on-the-job is a major
determinant of differences in earnings (other explanations are considered)
,
the underlying causes of differences in schooling become important.
Here differences in expected monetary returns are found to be an
important determinant of the amount of education demanded, and also to
be more important than expected nonmonetary returns. Factors on the
supply-of-resources side, however, such as the parents' income and
wealth, and the availability of subsidies for tuition and student loans,
are seen to be the most important determinants of the amount of school-
ing obtained. Parental wealth and public support of education,
therefore, through their influence on the amount of schooling received,
become important determinants of income differences later.

Two fundamental propositions appear to hold true across
countries and across time: first, personal income is very
unequally distributed; second, income and education are positively
correlated. Over the past several decades economists and other
social scientists have begun to link these propositions to ask,
"To what degree can *-,he distribution of income in a society be
explained by its distribution of education?" Most frequently this
question has been posed for developed nations, and for the United
States and the United Kingdom in particular where cross section
and time series personal income data are most readily available.
While initial work focused on the effects of differer, s in
schooling levels uoon the distribution of earnings, more recent
work has attempted to explain the basic causes o'f these
differences in schooling.
This article will consider first, differences in earnings and
property wealth as sources of inequality in the distribution of
income; second, the relation of education to differences in
earnings as developed by human capital theory and empirical
research using earnings functions, screening, and life-cycle
models; and third, causes of the differences in preschool train-
ing and formal schooling which lead to differences in earnings.
It demonstrates that differences in the amount of education
individuals receive is a major source of personal earnings
differences. It will conclude with a consideration of public
policies for the expansion of educational opportunity to reduce
inequality and promote economic development.
1. Income Distribution
Personal income consists of labor income, or earnings, plus
interest, rent and profit income derived from the ownership of
nonhuman wealth. Inequality in the income distribution is due in
larger measure to ineauality in the distribution of property
income than it is to inequality in earnings. This is because
wealth, and the income from property are distributed more
unequally than are human capital and earnings (Atkinson 1975 Ch.
4-9). As Schultz (1981 p. 76) points out, the earnings from the
human capital created by education and better health tend to loom
increasingly important relative to the income from land and
property as economic development occurs. This contributes to
greater equality in the distribution of income in the very long
run. Education and human capital formation contribute even
further to greater equality in the income distribution when
elementary and secondary education are deliberately extended to a
larger percentage of the population as economic development
occurs.
However, even in developed nations a great deal of inequality
in personal earnings remains. This article is confined to the
sources of these personal earnings differences. Inequality in
wealth is discussed only in so far as it affects differences in
educational attainment and labor earnings.
Five propositions characterize the distribution of earnings
truncated to remove the extreme righthand tail which may represent
economic rents to unique talents:
(1) both earnings and educational attainment are
unequally distributed across the population;
(2) individual differences in earnings vary positively
with differences in education;
(3) the variance of earnings exceeds the variance of
either innate ability or schooling attainment; or in other
words, earnings differences are not explained by ability and
schooling alone;
(4) earnings are positively skewed, and distributed
approximately log normally;
(5) the variance of earnings within a given age cohort
increases over time.
Traditionally at least three positive theories of the
distribution of earnings have competed for attention: the
stochastic theory, the ability theory, and human capital theory
(Sahota 1978). According to the stochastic theory, an
individual's position in the earnings distribution is largely a
matter of chance or luck: everyone may begin equal, but chance
events create eventual inequality in earnings. According to the
ability theory, earnings inequality is preordained by genetically
or culturally determined differences in underlying potential or
ability. Common to both of these theories is the notion that
earnings are beyond individual control. In contrast, human
capital theory asserts that earnings are determined by actions
taken and choices made by individuals and their families. Parents
help their children to choose an amount of education, subject to
some environmental constraints such as the child's ability and
family financial resources. This education, in turn, influences
the individual's position in the earnings distribution.
There are of course elements of truth in each polar case, so
that a synthesis of human capital formation choices, innate
ability factors, and pure luck (including especially a careful
choice of one's parents) is needed to explain the distributions of
earnings and of income that may be observed in all countries. But
since human capital formation is basic to the effects of education
on earnings and hence on the income distribution, there follows a
brief exposition of that.
2. Fundamentals of Human Capital Theory
In both competitive labor markets as well as many that are
centrally-planned, earnings differentials reflect underlying skill
differences: labor compensation varies directly with labor
productivity. According to human capital theory, individuals may
deliberately enhance their own productivity (and consequently,
their earnings) by investing in their own human capital. Numerous
possibilities for such self-investment exist, including not only
schooling and job training programs to acquire new skills, but
also expenditures upon medical care to improve health and
"longevity, as well as acquisition of information about the
location of higher-paying jobs. Recent research (Benson 1982) has
stressed the importance of preschool education of the child at
home (largely by the mother) as part of the human capital
formation process. While initial studies narrowly focused upon
investment in formal education, more recent work has widened the
focus to examine the impact of all prody'ive self-investments
upon earnings, as well as the reasons for differential investment.
According to human capital theory an individual or ^amily
decision-unit selects an amount of schooling (or other self-
investment) to maximize some objective function subject to some
constraints. The objective function may be lifetime income,
appropriately discounted, or it may be utility, a measure of
well-being. The constraints include the limits imposed by a
family's own financial resources, its capacity to borrow outside
funds, and limits upon the time the individual student (and in
earlier years the parents as well) can devote to education.
Optimal investment in schooling occurs where the discounted value
of the costs incurred equals the discounted value of the benefits
expected. Costs include out-of-pocket payments plus earnings
foregone. Benefits include the increase in expected lifetime
earnings as well as nonpecuniary returns such as improved working
conditions, job security, and the consumption benefits of
education expected from future leisure-time activities.
3. Empirical Results from the Schooling Model
Following the schooling model of human capital theory
developed by Jacob Mincer (1970), let Y equal annual earnings
for an individual with s years of schooling. Let n equal the
length of the working life and r equal the discount rate. The
present value of earnings equals
rn+s
-rt,. u -rs ,, -rn,
e dt = Ye (1-e )
s
If Y equals annual earnings in the absence of any schooling,
the present value of this earnings stream equals
j" e-^^dt = Y^ (1-e-^^)
.n
Y
By equating the two present values, we obtain an implicit solution
for r, the internal rate of return of s years of schooling:
Y = Y e'^^
's ^0 ^
•
In logarithms the equation becomes
Jln Y = jin Y^ + r s. (1)
which states that percentage differences in schooling are strictly
proportional to years of schooling, where the constant of
proportionality equals the internal rate of return. One
implication of eqn. (1) is that annual earnings will be more
unequal than the underlying distribution of schooling. A second
is that for a symmetric distribution of years of schooling,
earnings will be positively skewed. Finally, earnings inequality
and skewness are greater the higher is the rate of return.
From an empirical vantage point, the explanatory power of
eqn. (1) is quite low. Using cross-sectional US earnings data
Mincer (1974) found R s as low as 0.10. However, when eqn. (1)
is augmented by years of job experience (t) and weeks worked (w)
such as
2
in Y = in Y + r s + a,t - a„t + a,W (2)so 12 3
the goodness of fit improves substantially. For example. Mincer
is able to explain 33" of the differences in earned income by
differences in the amount of formal education (1974 p. 53).
Altogether, after controlling for weeks worked, he explains in at
least one census sample over 60 percent of the differences in
earnings by use of the number of years of formal schooling
(ignoring quality) and the years of experience, the latter
interpreted as human capital formation on the job.
A slightly different approach has been taken by Paul Taubman
(Atkinson 1976). Using longitudinal earnings data on former US
servicemen, he identifies numerous sources of inequality including
differences in formal education, college quality, mental ability,
family background, work experience, health status, and
nonpecuniary aspects of occupations. He concludes that after
controlling for a wide variety of variables, education is still
found to lead to large differences in earnings, although these
8differences are no larger than those due to ability or family
background differences.
A yery large number of estimates of earnings functions (eqn,
(2)), and of rates of return, covering many countries are now
available. These international estimates have been summarized by
Psacharopoulos (1981). In related work Psacharopoulos (1977)
demonstrates that cross country differences in income inequality
are highly correlated with the variance of educational attainment
in these countries. Furthermore both educational inequality and
earnings inequality are found to be much larger in less developed
than in developed countries.
4. Life-Cycle Earnings and the Screening Hypothesis
In developed economies the age profile of earnings exhibits
rapid growth during the first decade of work, followed by slower
growth over the next few decades and finally zero or slightly
negative growth as retirement approaches. In addition the spread
in earnings across members of a particular age cohort widens as
the cohort ages. These characteristics suggest that individual
human capital stocks first increase through post school investment
and then decrease through physical depreciation and technological
obsolescence. The increasing inequality in earnings for a cohort
over time suggests increasing inequality in human capital stocks
as well. Dynamic optimization models (Ben-Porath 1967) explain
human capital investment behavior over the life cycle consistent
with this observed age profile of earnings. These models also
explain why the earnings variance increases with age: if the more
educated are not only more efficient in the workplace, but also
more efficient in acquiring human capital, then initial schooling
differences will contribute to differences in post school
investment behavior (Graham 1981). Changes in relative cohort
sizes over time also may explain the increasing variance of
cohort-specific earnings (Layard 1979 pp. S65-S97),
Human capital theory asserts that schooling and training are
productivity enhancing activities. The screening hypothesis, in
contrast, maintains that the main function of formal education is
not to augment productivity but merely to filter or label existing
productivity differences. Schools exist to administer tests in
order to separate high ability individuals from those of lower
ability. They assign grades and grant diplomas to label
individuals for prospective employers who in turn may be willing
to pay an earnings permium to proper! v screened high ability
workers. The screening challenge to numan capital theory has
itself been challenged. If schools function only to label
students, then surely a less costly, less time-intensive method of
filtering could be found. Why, for example, could not a firm more
effectively screen its own workers? Moreover, if diplomas serve
as labels, why do students who stop just short of graduation earn
nearly as much as students who do graduate? Layard and
Psacharopoulos (1974) advance these and other criticisms of the
screening hypothesis.
Out of this debate a consensus appears to be forming.
Education serves both a productivity enhancing and labelling
function, with the relative importance of each varying with the
10
level of education and the type of curriculum studied. Ultimately
the screening challenge has benefitted human capital theory by
enriching the basic schooling model to include the influence of
other factors upon earnings.
5. Causes of Differences in Schooling
The major key to differences in earnings lies in the
differences in the amount of schooling received. As has been
suggested above, differences in both the quantity and quality o-f
formal education, along with the related differences in human
capital formation on-the-job, explain most of the observed
differences in earnings.
Causes of differences in the amount of schooling among
individual families can be divided into differences in the supply
of opportunities and in differences in the investment-related
demands for education. There are differences in the supply of
opportunities (within a conceptual framework appropriate to the
analysis of investment decisions) due to the differences in the
supply of funds from state support and from family financial
resources, both of which can limit (or expand) opportunities from
the supply-side. There are differences in investment demands for
education because of different expected net monetary and
non-monetary returns at successive levels, differing ability to
learn and hence to profit from further education, and differences
among families and individual students in their planning horizons.
nFactors Related to Denand
A model that tests for the relative importance of sources of
differences in demand as compared to supply as determinants of
differences in educational attainment has been estimated by
McMahon (1983) for US students and their families. His results
are consistent with those predicted by the Becker model (1975, pp.
94-144) in the sense that after controlling for differences in
ability, the amount of further education planned is limited
eventually by lower private rates of return at each higher
educational level, due largely to increasing opportunity costs as
the student goes further in school. This effect is illustrated in
Fig. 1 by the downward sloping investment demand function,
D.D.. That is, when the expected rate of return for each
student (shown on the vertical axis) is expressed as a function of
the amount of schooling planned, (shown on the horizontal axis)
the private rate of return is lower for college then for high
school, and lower for most graduate degrees than for two or four
years of college. This rate of return is found to be a negative
and highly significant determinant of years of schooling,
controlling for other factors and using two-stage least squares to
estimate the structural demand and supply equations to eliminate
simultaneous bias.
Differences in ability, as measured by achievement test
scores, which in principle would shift the investment demand
outward, were found to have an insignificant effect on the amount
of education chosen. McMahon (1983) also finds other factors on
the demand side, such as a wide range of expected non-monetary
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returns and the degree of uncertainty about expected returns to be
of quite limited significance. However, after controlling for
family income the education of the parents (especially the mother)
does have a positive and significant relation to educational
investment demand. This may reflect a somewhat longer planning
horizon in families with more education.
Factors Related to the Supply of Educational Opportunities
The strongest and most significant effects are found to be
those related to the availability of financial resources affecting
the supply of educational opportunities available. Private
capital markets are notoriously imperfect when attempts are made
to borrow to finance human capital (in the absence of government
guarentees). Therefore, internal family sources of funds, and
public support of public schools, loom very important in
determining whether or not educational opportunities are
available. Lave et aj_ (1981, p. 262) have found, for example,
that the years of education actually available to Mexican peasants
in each of 37 towns were of overwhelming importance in determining
actual educational achievement, whereas "IQ contributed wery
little to explaining variance in educational achievement".
McMahon's (1983) econometric estimates for the amount of education
undertaken by US males find family disposable income to be highly
significant. This shifts what was found to be an almost vertical
supply-of-funds function to the right as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The result is a larger amount of education chosen at E„ (and
hence I-;,) by and for children who come from the higher income
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families. The rate of return may be somewhat lower for these
students (who are of equal ability when Ep and E. are on the
same demand function which controls for differences in ability),
but their lifetime earnings are much larger.
Ability test scores are well known to be very highly
correlated with parental income. This reflects the probability
that children from higher income families are very likely to have
had the advantages of the better schools found in higher income
neighborhoods and school districts. This is very important in the
US and in other countries that have a highly decentralized system
of local or private schools that vary widely in quality (McMahon
1973). This correlation of ability test scores with parental
income can also reflect dif-'^ering home investments in children as
developed by Leibowitz (1974) and Benson (1932). In less
developed countries, children from low income families in rural
areas also attend the poorest schools, with similarly adverse
effects on their ability test scores. With this positive
correlation -etween ability and family income, therefore, the
demand for investment in education is further to the right for
young people from higher income families because of their higher
ability. This explains why students who both are from higher
income families and have higher ability test scores tend to go the
farthest in school (see E- or I_ in Fig. 1).
6. Public Education Policies and Inequality
A myriad of government policies including tax and expenditure
programs as well as policies on education have direct and
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indirect, intended and unintended, effects upon the distribution
of income. It is inportant therefore to consider the goals of
such policies. Should government attempt to reduce the degree of
earnings inequality (outcomes), or should it strive only to reduce
inequality of opportunities? In general, redistributive income
tax and transfer schemes are advocated by those who would have the
government influence economic outcomes directly, while educational
policies are favored by those who seek first to promote greater
equality of opportunity. But clearly, these two goals need not be
inconsistent: one effective way to promote greater earnings
equality in the long run may be to promote greater equality of
access to education in the short run. (Layard 1979 pp.
S193-S212).
Inequality of educational opportunities is particularly acute
in less developed countries. In Indonesia, for example, most
children are withdrawn from school after grades 5 or 6 by their
parents who want them to work on the farm and are not willing to
bear the rising cost of foregone earnings. For this reason, the
usual educational pyramid in such countries exhibits a wide base
(most of the population with no more than a primary education) and
narrow rniHd Is levels (fewer individuals with a secondary education
and fewer still with higher education or advanced technical
training). As such, the distribution of earnings tends to be
highly skewed in these countries, with the benefits of
technological progress accruing only to those in the
nonagricultural sector at the top of the pyramid. If the benefits
of progress are to be shared by all, the education and skills of
15
workers at the bottom of the pyramid need to be improved. This
could be accomplished most directly by raising the age of
compulsory schooling and redirecting government monies toward
augmenting the quality and quantity of primary and secondary
school ing.
In developed countries, inequality of educational attainment
is less severe, but still significant. In the US, for example,
58.6 percent of the population 25 or more years old had graduated
from high school by 1980, but only 17.0 percent were college
graduates. To the extent inequality in educational attainment
results not from inequality in native ability or other such demand
factors, but from inequality on the supply side, the objective of
federal education policies should be to minimize local differences
in supplies of educational resources and opportunities by
extending student loans and grants for higher education and
improving the quality of public primary and secondary education.
Will greater eriuality of educational opportunities promote
greater equality of earnings? The screening hypothesis and human
capital theory provide two '^ery different answers. According to
the screening hypothesis, if employers cannot identify
productivity differences among their workers, then in the absence
of screening all workers would be paid the same. The result of
schooling and labelling is to insure that higher ability
individuals will receive higher earnings than less able workers.
In this case an extension of schooling to all segments of society
will only serve to filter individuals more finely and to make the
distribution of labor earnings less equal. On the other hand, if
16
human capital theory is correct in asserting that schools function
primarily to enhance worker productivity, then greater equality in
schooling may lead to greater equality in earnings.
But even human capital theory would not go so far as to
suggest that equality of opportunity necessarily engenders
equality of outcomes. Differences in both luck and innate
abilities abound. However, to the extent that some ability
differenc-3 can be traced to differences in preschool parental
training or differences in the quality of primary education, then
publically provided educational programs affect not only the
supply of opportunities but also student demand for advanced
education. The "Head Start" program launched in the US in the
1960s was designed to augment the early training of economically
disadvantaged preschool children who were receiving little
preschool training at home. The objective of the program was to
provide these children with skills that would improve their
performance in primary school and thereby raise their effective
demand for more advance education.
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